In the shadow of the 2020 pandemic, the Federal Trade Commission launched what would become a paradigmatic case of regulatory overreach against one of America’s most innovative companies. Initially launched in the final months of the first Trump administration, the FTC filed a suit against Meta, alleging that its acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp were predatory maneuvers rather than strategic investments—a claim that fundamentally misunderstands both the companies involved and the dynamic digital marketplace.
This case represents a troubling shift in antitrust philosophy—abandoning the consumer welfare standard that served as the foundation of American competition policy for decades in favor of a European-style interventionist approach fixated on corporate structure rather than actual consumer outcomes. Perhaps most concerning is the case’s continuation under Andrew Ferguson’s leadership, suggesting either a bipartisan misconception about digital markets or an alarming instance of bureaucratic inertia transcending administrations.
The FTC’s central argument portrays Meta as a monopolistic giant controlling “personal social networking services” in America—a narrative that collapses upon even casual examination of market realities. The Commission conveniently ignores TikTok’s meteoric rise to 135 million American users, X’s substantial presence with 105 million domestic users, and YouTube’s commanding reach of over 200 million users. These platforms vigorously compete for user attention in a continuously evolving marketplace that bears no resemblance to the static monopoly described in the FTC’s complaint.
Similarly, the messaging ecosystem demonstrates robust competition that the Commission strategically overlooks. American consumers freely navigate between traditional SMS, WhatsApp, Signal, and Telegram, switching platforms effortlessly based on features, privacy preferences, and social networks. This flourishing consumer choice landscape renders the FTC’s monopoly allegations not merely incorrect but fundamentally detached from reality.
The empirical evidence overwhelmingly contradicts the predatory acquisition narrative. When Meta acquired Instagram in 2012, the platform had fewer than 50 million users and generated no revenue—hardly the profile of an established competitor. Rather than suppressing Instagram’s potential, Meta’s investments and expertise catalyzed extraordinary growth, expanding its user base to over 2 billion globally while developing a business model now projected to generate $30 billion in annual revenue for 2025.
WhatsApp tells a similar story of transformation. At acquisition in 2014, WhatsApp had approximately 450 million users—impressive but a fraction of its current reach. Under Meta’s stewardship, WhatsApp has expanded more than six-fold to reach nearly 3 billion users worldwide. These dramatic growth trajectories definitively refute the notion that Meta acquired these platforms to eliminate competition. Instead, Meta’s resources, technological expertise, and network infrastructure have enabled these services to scale at unprecedented rates, creating substantially more value for users and the digital ecosystem than would have been possible had they remained independent.
The FTC’s crusade against Meta reveals far more about the Commission’s ideological agenda than about genuine market concerns. Rather than examining empirical evidence of consumer benefit, the agency has constructed a theoretical house of cards built on outdated notions of market competition that fail to capture the dynamic reality of the digital ecosystem.
Meta’s stewardship of Instagram and WhatsApp tells a compelling story that directly contradicts the FTC’s narrative. In both cases, Meta transformed relatively modest platforms into global powerhouses: Instagram grew from fewer than 50 million users to over 2 billion, while WhatsApp expanded from 450 million to nearly 3 billion users. These platforms now generate billions in revenue where previously they produced almost none. Such dramatic expansion represents the antithesis of anticompetitive behavior—instead demonstrating how strategic investment and integration can create unprecedented value for users and shareholders alike.
If permitted to succeed, this misguided regulatory assault threatens not just Meta but the entire innovation framework that has made American technology the global standard-bearer. By punishing successful integration and growth rather than protecting consumers from actual harm, the FTC risks undermining the very competitive dynamism it claims to protect.
